States may not require additional
proof of citizenship on federal forms designed to streamline
voter-registration procedures, the Supreme Court ruled Monday.
The court rejected a requirement passed by Arizona voters in
2004 that potential voters supply proof of eligibility beyond an
applicant’s oath on the federal form that he or she is a citizen.
The court ruled 7 to 2 that the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 trumps Arizona’s Proposition 200.
The
federal law “precludes Arizona from requiring a federal form applicant
to submit information beyond that required by the form itself,” Justice
Antonin Scalia wrote for the majority.
Three other states have similar proof-of-citizenship laws, and others have considered the additional requirement.
Justices
Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito Jr. wrote separate dissents,
although both made the point that the majority ignored the
Constitution’s demand that states set the requirements for voter
registration.
“I would construe the law as only requiring Arizona
to accept and use the form as part of its voter registration process,
leaving the state free to request whatever additional information it
determines is necessary to ensure that voters meet the qualifications it
has the constitutional authority to establish,” Thomas wrote.
The
Arizona proposition was immediately challenged after passage. A
three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit —
which included retired justice Sandra Day O’Connor, sitting by
designation — also held that federal law precluded Arizona’s action.
O’Connor was sitting in the courtroom Monday as her former colleagues upheld the decision.
Scalia
noted that the Constitution’s elections clause, which empowers Congress
to preempt state regulations governing the “times, places and manner”
of holding congressional elections, gives weight to the federal
regulation that states “accept and use” the federal form to enroll
voters.
The state-by-state battle over who is eligible to vote,
what kind of identification or proof may be required and even the hours
of voting prompted a host of legal battles leading up to the 2012
elections. In general, Republicans proposed new restrictions as
necessary to combat voter fraud, while Democrats said such moves would
harm minorities and the poor, who often do not have easy access to the
required credentials.
The court’s oral arguments and its decision avoided those partisan battles and concentrated on questions of federalism.
But interest groups that challenged the law claimed a great victory.
“Today’s
decision sends a strong message that states cannot block their citizens
from registering to vote by superimposing burdensome paperwork
requirements on top of federal law,” said Nina Perales, vice president
of litigation for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational
Fund.
“The Supreme Court has affirmed that all U.S. citizens have
the right to register to vote using the national postcard, regardless of
the state in which they live.”
Groups that supported Arizona called the decision dire.
“The
integrity of our nation’s elections suffered a blow today from the
Supreme Court,” said Tom Fitton, president of the conservative legal
group Judicial Watch. “This issue takes on increasing urgency with the
prospect of 11 million illegal immigrants being given amnesty. It is
essential that our elections be secured by ensuring that only citizens
register to vote.”
Scalia, writing for Chief Justice John G.
Roberts Jr. and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, said Arizona is not
powerless to protect against noncitizens voting.
He said the state
need not register voters when it has other proof that they are not
citizens. He also said the state could petition the federal Election
Assistance Commission to alter the form to require evidence of
citizenship, and go to court if the commission fails to do so.
Alito in dissent pointed out “that prospect does little to assuage constitutional concerns.”
“The
EAC currently has no members, and there is no reason to believe that it
will be restored to life in the near future. If that situation
persists, Arizona’s ability to obtain a judicial resolution of its
constitutional claim is problematic.”
Editor's note: The case is Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona and you can read the opinion by clicking here.
U. S. Supreme Court: Imposition Of Harsher Sentences Due To Sentencing Guidelines Changes That Post Date Offense Violates "Ex Post Facto" Constitutional Prohibition.
WASHINGTON — In a 5-to-4 decision
that broke along ideological lines, the Supreme Court on Monday ruled
that courts violate the Constitution when they rely on current federal
sentencing guidelines if those guidelines call for harsher punishment
than the ones in place at the time of the offense.
If such sentencing guidelines were mandatory, as they once were, the case would have been easy. But in 2005 the Supreme Court ruled
that the guidelines must be treated as advisory to avoid running afoul
of a line of Sixth Amendment cases requiring that juries rather than
judges make the factual findings supporting criminal sentences.
The question that divided the justices on Monday was whether the current
discretionary guidelines retained enough force to subject defendants to
a substantial risk of additional punishment and thus violate the
Constitution’s ex post facto clause, which prohibits enhanced
retroactive punishment.
The case, Peugh v. United States, No. 12-62, arose from bank fraud
committed in 1999 and 2000 by Marvin Peugh, an owner of two farming
businesses. When it came time for sentencing in 2010, the trial judge
took note of the guidelines then in place, which suggested a sentence
between 70 and 87 months. The judge settled on the lower number.
Had the judge instead referred to the guidelines in place at the time of
the fraud, the suggested range would have been 30 to 37 months. “The
low end of the 2009 guidelines range,” still in effect in 2010, Justice
Sonia Sotomayor wrote for the majority on Monday, “was 33 months higher
than the high end of the 1998 guidelines range,” which were in effect in
1999 and 2000.
Justice Sotomayor said guidelines imposed significant constraints on
sentencing judges even after being made advisory. The guidelines
remained, she said, quoting an earlier Supreme Court decision, “the
starting point and the initial benchmark.” Trial judges are required to
explain the basis for the sentences they impose, she added, with a major
departure from the guidelines requiring “a more significant
justification than a minor one.”
Appellate review of sentences is relaxed, though it does take account of
variance from the guidelines along with other factors. “Common sense
indicates that, in general, this system will steer district courts to
more within-guidelines sentences,” Justice Sotomayor wrote.
That was enough, she said, to establish a violation of the ex post facto
clause in Mr. Peugh’s case under the standard set out in a 1995
decision, California Department of Corrections v. Morales.
That decision said the clause bars new laws that create a “sufficient
risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered
crimes.”
“A retrospective increase in the guidelines range applicable to a
defendant,” Justice Sotomayor concluded, “creates a sufficient risk of a
higher sentence to constitute an ex post facto violation.”
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer and Elena Kagan joined
all of the majority opinion, and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy most of it.
In dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the guidelines, since
they are only advisory, “do not constrain the discretion of district
courts and, thus, have no legal effect on a defendant’s sentence.” That
means, he said, that there was no violation of the ex post facto clause
under the standard announced in the Morales case.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justices Antonin Scalia and Samuel
A. Alito Jr. joined that part of Justice Thomas’s dissent.
Writing only for himself, Justice Thomas added that the analysis both
sides had used, derived from the Morales decision, was at odds with the
original meaning of the ex post facto clause, which referred, he said,
only to “the punishment affixed by law.”
This was, he said, self-criticism. “As the author of Morales,” Justice
Thomas wrote, “failure to apply the original meaning was an error to
which I succumbed.”
The
Supreme Court on Monday upheld the police practice of taking DNA
samples from people who have been arrested but not convicted of a crime,
ruling that it amounts to the 21st century version of fingerprinting.
The
ruling was 5-4. Justice Antonin Scalia, a conservative, joined three of
the court’s more liberal members — Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia
Sotomayor and Elena Kagan — in dissenting.
The five justices in
the majority ruled that DNA sampling, after an arrest “for a serious
offense” and when officers “bring the suspect to the station to be
detained in custody,” does not violate the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition of unreasonable searches.
Under those specifications, the court said, “taking and analyzing a
cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and
photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.”
Scalia’s siding with the liberals
reflects his growing concern over the past five years about privacy,
said Tom Goldstein, the publisher of SCOTUSblog, who teaches at Harvard
Law School and is a Supreme Court analyst for NBC News.
“We’ve
seen several decisions where he has joined more liberal justices to find
greater privacy rights,” he said in an interview. “It’s not a big
surprise in recent years, but it is a surprise in the sense of his
general conservatism.”
While a cheek swab does constitute a search
under the law, the court noted that it requires “but a light touch” and
no surgical intrusion — a critical point, the court said, in
determining whether it was reasonable.
At an oral argument in
February, Justice Samuel Alito called the question perhaps the most
important criminal procedure case the court had taken up in decades.
Twenty-eight states and the federal government take DNA swabs from
people under arrest before they can be tried.
The case arose from
the arrest of a 26-year-old Maryland man, Alonzo King, in 2009 on a
charge of second-degree assault. The police took a swab of DNA from his
cheek, ran it through a database and matched it to an unsolved rape from
six years earlier.
King was convicted of rape and sentenced to
life in prison. He pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor for the 2009 assault.
The Maryland Court of Appeals later reversed the rape conviction on the
grounds that the DNA sample was an unreasonable search.
“Today’s
judgment will, to be sure, have the beneficial effect of solving more
crimes,” Scalia wrote in his dissent. “Then again, so would the taking
of DNA samples from anyone who flies on an airplane.”
In an
allusion to the technique of taking a swab from the cheek, Scalia wrote:
“I doubt that the proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties
would have been so eager to open their mouths for royal inspection.”
The
Maryland law restricts DNA swabbing to people arrested for certain
violent crimes, but justices, including Chief Justice John Roberts,
worried during the oral argument that other laws might not be so
restrictive. Roberts wondered why they couldn’t be applied to simple
traffic stops.
Roberts voted with the majority Monday, as did
Alito, who tipped his hand at the oral argument by saying that DNA
sampling “involves a very minimal intrusion on personal privacy.”
Justice
Anthony Kennedy, considered the court’s swing vote, delivered the
opinion of the court. Justices Clarence Thomas, who usually votes with
the court’s conservatives, and Stephen Breyer, who generally votes with
the liberals, also voted with the majority.
The court’s majority
ruling also said that the government has an interesting in identifying a
person under arrest so that a judge can make an informed decision about
granting bail. Today, it takes as long as two and a half weeks for DNA
tests to come back, but lawyers noted before the court that instant DNA
testing is not far off.